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INTRODUCTION
Confronted by challenges in mobilising state cooperation, gaining custody of
accused, and affirming itself as an effective international judicial body, the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC) has faced an uphill struggle in asserting its authority.
When Burundi, Gambia and South Africa announced their intent to withdraw from
the ICC ahead of the 15th Assembly of State Parties of the ICC in November 2016, the
sense of crisis surrounding the Court was further heightened, despite recent achieve-
ments such as the trial of Ahmad al-Mahdi over the destruction of cultural sites in
northern Mali, which resulted in a guilty plea, and the issuance of the ICC’s first
reparations order in the Germain Katanga case.
Backlashes against international courts are not uncommon, though withdrawals sit
at the extreme end of the spectrum of measures that states can deploy to express
discontent with an international judicial body. In fact, states’ rejection of interna-
tional court rulings, appending of reservations to international human rights treaties,
and even withdrawals from international treaties and institutions form part and
parcel of international relations, where state consent still underpins participation in
international legal regimes. Several Latin American countries, for instance, have
withdrawn or threatened to withdraw from the Inter-American Convention of
Human Rights, thereby removing themselves from the jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. However, three near simultaneous withdrawals
from an international court are unprecedented and signaled that the ICC might be in
serious trouble. Moreover, since the ICC is seen by many to represent certain core
values on which international society is based, erosion of state support for the ICC is
felt as posing a fundamental threat.
Initial concerns that the withdrawals would trigger a cascade of states leaving the ICC
and lead in the long term to the Court becoming obsolete, now appear premature.1 In
February 2017, following Yahja Jammeh’s removal from power, the new Gambian
president, Adama Barrow, revoked Gambia’s notice of withdrawal. The South African
government also revoked its intent to withdraw in March 2017, after the Constitutional
Court ruled the notice was unconstitutional because it had not received parliamentary
approval. Moreover, the resolution on collective withdrawal from the ICC adopted at
the January 2017 African Union (AU) Summit reflected the persistence of deep
disagreements between AU member states about the desirability of such a move.2
1 Though the issue of ICC withdrawals has not entirely dissipated, as illustrated by Zambia’s announcement
that it would organise a public consultation about its ICC membership. ‘Zambia launches public poll for ICC
exit sparking concerns of African exodus’, International Business Times, 27 March 2017.
2 Allan Ngari, ‘The AU’s (Other) ICC Strategy’, ISS Today, 14 February 2017 (https://issafrica.org/iss-today/
the-aus-other-icc-strategy); Mark Kersten, ‘Not All It’s Cracked Up to Be – the African Union’s “ICC With-
drawal Strategy”‘, Justice in Conflict blog, 6 February 2017 (https://justiceinconflict.org/2017/02/06/not-
all-its-cracked-up-to-be-the-african-unions-icc-withdrawal-strategy/). 2
A COURT IN CRISIS? THE ICC IN AFRICA, AND BEYONDWhile opponents of the Court have been able to take centre stage in debates about the
ICC’s role in Africa, the Court also enjoys a degree of support among African states.
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania and Tunisia have been
steadfast in their support for the Court and countered the push at the AU for a mass
withdrawal. The anti-ICC discourse propounded by some African states is also not
necessarily reflective of wider public sentiments on the continent towards the ICC, nor
should it overshadow the multidimensional nature of African civil society’s attitude
towards the Court.3
The fact that the ICC crisis has retreated from the brink should, however, not lead to
complacency about the profound challenges still facing the Court. After setting out
the background to the current tensions between the ICC and African countries, this
paper discusses four areas of ongoing tension surrounding the ICC’s work that could
feed further backlashes against the Court if left unaddressed.
3 Tessa Alleblas et.al, ‘Is the International Criminal Court Biased Against Africans? Kenyan Victims Don’t Think
So’, Washington Post Monkey Cage blog, 6 March 2017 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2017/03/06/is-the-international-criminal-court-biased-against-africans-kenyan-victims-dont-
think-so/?utm_term=.ba19f3de0568); Marlies Glasius, ‘What is Global Justice and Who Decides? Civil
Society and Victim Responses to the International Criminal Court’s First Investigations’, Human Rights Quar-
terly 31:2, 2009; Phil Clark, ‘All These Outsiders Shouted Louder Than Us: Civil Society Engagement with
Transitional Justice in Uganda’, Security in Transition Working Paper, London School of Economics, 2015
(http://www.securityintransition.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/CS-and-TJ-working-paper_
Uganda.pdf); Thomas Obel Hansen and Chandra Lekha Sriram, ‘Fighting for Justice (and Survival): Kenyan
Civil Society Accountability Strategies and their Enemies’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 9:3,
2015.3
DRIVERS OF THE AFRICAN-LED BACKLASH
The decision by Burundi, South Africa, and Gambia to withdraw from the ICC follows-
on the heels of long-standing tensions between the Court, individual African states
and the AU.4 These first came to the fore following the Court’s indictment of
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in 2009, which saw the AU calling on the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) to defer the Sudan investigation and asking AU
members not to cooperate with the Court for the execution of the arrest warrant
against al-Bashir. Discontent with the Court further heightened with the indictments
in 2011 of senior Kenyan officials over the 2007-2008 electoral violence in the
country and the focusing of the Court’s activities on Africa.
Although the current backlash can be traced back to the ICC’s investigations and
prosecutions in Sudan, Libya and Kenya, it is important to remember that the ICC has
never enjoyed unanimous support among African states. Many African countries
who participated in the 1998 Rome Conference were supporters of a strong and
independent court (forming part of what was known as the ‘like-minded group’), and
Africa constitutes the largest regional grouping among ICC member states. But from
the outset there has been a significant – albeit nonmajority – group of African
countries that were opposed to or noncommittal towards the Court. While 34
African countries joined the Court, 16 states decided to remain outside its ambit
(eight signed but did not ratify the Rome Statute, while eight are non-members). This
contrasts with regional groupings such as Western Europe or Latin America and the
Caribbean, where membership of the ICC is near universal. At present, opponents of
the Court include both non-members of the ICC, such as Rwanda, Ethiopia and
Sudan, and member states such as Kenya and Burundi.
An interplay of political and normative factors has driven the backlash against the
ICC. Critiques levied by African states against the ICC centre on the Court’s perceived
bias, selectivity, politicisation, and disregard for African views on how best to
promote peace and justice on the continent. Much of the discord stems from the fact
that the Court’s investigations have primarily, if not exclusively, focused on sub-
Saharan Africa (nine of its ten current investigations are in African countries). Some
downplay this bias by pointing out that many situations were self-referred to the
Court by African countries (Democratic Republic of Congo or DRC, Uganda, Central
African Republic or CAR, Mali) and that the scale of grave human rights violations and
general weakness of domestic judiciaries in African countries warrants the ICC’s
4 The particularistic motivations for these three withdrawals are, however, varied and, in some instances,
also tied in closely with domestic political considerations. On Burundi, see for instance, Stef Vandeginste,
‘The ICC Bruexit: Free at Last? Burundi on its way out of the Rome Statute’, IOB Analysis and Policy Brief 20,
Institute of Development and Policy Management, University of Antwerp, October 2016.4
A COURT IN CRISIS? THE ICC IN AFRICA, AND BEYONDintervention.5 However, the ICC’s African focus has also been driven by political
considerations and institutional self-interest: African situations were initially, though
mistakenly, thought to constitute ‘easy cases’ that would present the nascent Court
with an opportunity to demonstrate its relevance and effectiveness without risking
major political upset among powerful countries.6
This perceived bias has been further fueled by the Office of the Prosecutor’s (OTP)
willingness to let preliminary investigations in countries like Colombia drag on, while
acting swiftly on African situations, and its seemingly deliberate selectivity in
choosing not to investigate a number of situations outside Africa despite strong
evidence of gross human rights violations (e.g., Iraq and Palestine). This has led some
to accuse the Court of (un)willingly acting to protect the interests of powerful states.7
Further compounding this perception is that certain permanent states on the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC), many of whom have not joined the ICC, have used
its referral power to target certain African states while insulating their allies from
similar ICC scrutiny. The backlash by African countries thus reflects a frustration with
the ICC’s inability to promote a more equal international order and concerns that it
is evolving into yet another instrument through which powerful states seek to
control weaker states.8
Criticism of the ICC’s investigations also stems from what African states and the AU
perceive as the UNSC and ICC’s disregard for African views on how best to pursue
peace and justice on the continent. The AU submitted requests for the deferral of the
ICC’s investigations in Sudan on the grounds that pursuing the arrest of President al-
Bashir could pose a threat to the AU’s peace mediation efforts, and, in Kenya,
requested a further deferral on the grounds that ICC investigations could revive polit-
ical tensions and that precedence should be given to domestic prosecutions instead.
In both instances, however, the UNSC rejected the AU’s request (in the case of
Sudan, the request was not even tabled by the UNSC), with the OTP also adopting a
narrow interpretation of its power, under Article 53 of the Rome Statute, to defer an
investigation in ‘the interests of justice’. While the validity of the grounds for deferral
invoked by the AU is up for debate – especially in the Kenya case – the reluctance of
5 Jean-Baptiste Vilmer, ‘The African Union and the International Criminal Court: Counteracting the Crisis,
International Affairs 92:6, 2016, p. 1328.
6 As David Bosco points out, efforts to accommodate major powers, in particular the United States, have
been a key strategy pursued by the ICC in an effort to contain efforts by these states to marginalise the
Court. David Bosco, Rough Justice. The International Criminal Court in a World of Politics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014).
7 Tim Murithi, ‘The African Union and the International Criminal Court: An Embattled Relationship?’, Policy
Brief 8, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Cape Town, 2013; Benson Chinedu Olugbuo, ‘The African
Union, the United Nations Security Council and the Politicisation of International Justice in Africa’, African
Journal of Legal Studies 7:3 2014; John Dugard, ‘Palestine and the International Criminal Court: Institutional
Failure or Bias?’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 11:3, 2013.
8 Murithi 2013, op.cit; William Schabas, ‘The Banality of International Justice’, Journal of International Crim-
inal Justice 11:3, 2013.5
A COURT IN CRISIS? THE ICC IN AFRICA, AND BEYONDthe UNSC and ICC to engage the AU on this matter has created resentment over the
latter’s apparent sidelining in decisions affecting the continent.
Another important point of friction has been the ICC’s rejection of immunities for
sitting heads of state. The AU has countered that the pursuit of sitting heads of states
may have profound destabilising effects in the countries concerned and the wider
region. Many African states are also wary that calls for a rejection of heads of state
immunities serve as a legal veneer for Western states’ pursuit of regime change in
some African countries. States have further questioned whether the Rome Statute’s
waiver of immunities overrides states’ duties under international law to respect the
diplomatic immunity of sitting heads of state, particularly in relations ICC state
parties have with non-state parties (South Africa, for instance, invoked this argument
to explain its decision to withdraw from the ICC).
It can be countered that the African backlash against the ICC has largely been politi-
cally motivated. The discourse in which the ICC is branded as a neocolonial institution
targeting Africa has proved useful to certain political leaders seeking to protect
themselves from ICC investigations. That self-protection has driven some of the ICC
backlash is also clearly reflected in the introduction of an immunity clause for sitting
heads of state or government, and other state officials during their tenure in office,
in the Malabo Protocol of the proposed African Court of Justice and Human and
Peoples’ Rights (ACJHPR).9 In such instances, critiques of the ICC do not reflect a
genuine concern about imbalances in the implementation of international criminal
justice, but rather a lack of political will to end impunity for grave human rights viola-
tions. The fact that the AU only expressed concern with the ICC when it started inves-
tigating political leaders, while seemingly having no issue with the ICC’s earlier
African-based investigations of rebel groups, suggests that a bias also exists on the
part of African states. Furthermore, their critique of UNSC interference in the Court’s
operations may smack of insincerity, as some African states voted in favour of UNSC
resolutions referring the situations in Libya and Sudan to the ICC, and the AU itself
has been keen to use the UNSC’s deferral power when it suited its political inter-
ests.10
Some also argue that African states themselves could do more to encourage the ICC
to open investigations into non-African situations.11 However, in reality, redressing
this imbalance lies beyond the ability of African states alone. Considering their strong
attachment to the principle of sovereignty – which many African states continue to
see as key to protecting themselves from foreign intervention – and their geopoliti-
cally weaker position, African states are ill-positioned to take the initiative in refer-
9 African Union, Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and
Human Rights, 27 June 2014, Art. 46A bis.
10 Vilmer 2016, op.cit, p. 1330.
11 David Scheffer, ‘How to Move Beyond South Africa’s Notice of Withdrawal from the ICC’, Just Security blog,
24 October 2016 (https://www.justsecurity.org/33778/move-south-africas-notice-withdrawal-icc/). 6
A COURT IN CRISIS? THE ICC IN AFRICA, AND BEYONDring powerful states to the ICC. Furthermore, even if African states made such a
referral, it would still be dependent on the willingness of the Prosecutor to act on this
information,12 as illustrated by the unsuccessful referral made by the Comoros in
2013 over the actions of Israeli troops against a Comoros-registered vessel that tried
to break the blockade of Gaza in 2010.
While one can acknowledge that political interests have driven some of the backlash
against the ICC, it would be short-sighted to brush aside legitimate critiques of the
Court’s disappointing record in producing impartial and balanced justice. This is not
to deny the important work that is being done by the ICC, or to question the commit-
ment of ICC officials to the project of justice, but rather to recognise that the ICC is
an imperfect institution that operates in highly complex and volatile social and polit-
ical environments, and can produce unintended negative effects on the environ-
ments in which it operates. The ways in which the ICC sometimes entrenches
inequality before the law, reinforces geopolitical imbalances, and imposes a norma-
tive order that does not align with all, should be taken seriously, and efforts made by
the Court, its member states, and ICC proponents to minimise such impacts. In the
remainder of the paper, I highlight four factors that are likely to be continuing
sources of tension regarding the ICC, even in the absence of further state
withdrawals, and which therefore warrant ongoing policy attention.
12 Tor Krever, ‘Africa in the Dock: On ICC Bias’, Critical Legal Thinking blog, 30 October 2016 (http://criticalle-
galthinking.com/2016/10/30/africa-in-the-dock-icc-bias/). 7
CHAFING NORMATIVE ORDERS
The backlash against the Court is not merely an issue of politics but also more broadly
reflects tensions around the hierarchy of norms and values in the international
system, as well as persistent frictions between statist and cosmopolitan views on the
place of international criminal law in the world order. While much has been made of
the universalistic aspirations of the ICC project, and many ICC advocates take it as a
given that the values represented by the Rome Statute trump other values and
norms, the conflict between the AU and ICC highlights the fact that no single norma-
tive order exists. Rather, there are a variety of normative orders within the interna-
tional system that sometimes chafe and collide. Consequently, states make
competing claims about which norms predominate and may challenge some of the
norms and values propounded by the ICC.
The most evident example of this has been the challenge brought by African states
concerning the scope of immunities for sitting heads of state. African states’ opposi-
tion to the ICC also suggests disagreements with how the international criminal
justice system as embodied by the ICC conceptualises responsibility and the nature
of international crimes. For instance, the inclusion of terrorism, mercenarism,
trafficking, the illicit exploitation of natural resources, and unconstitutional change
of government within the criminal jurisdiction of the proposed ACJHPR indicates that
African states favour a broader view of what constitutes international crimes. In their
view, international criminal justice, as embodied by the ICC, does not adequately
address security challenges that are of particular concern to African states and
underpin many of the armed conflicts in Africa.13
While there is no immediate solution to resolving or arbitrating such norms or
conflicts – beyond, for instance, asking for an advisory opinion from the International
Court of Justice on the issue of immunities for sitting heads of state – future dialogue
on the ICC needs to acknowledge the existence of these competing normative claims,
and the validity of some of them, and engage in a genuine reflection on the possibility
of adapting the current international criminal justice framework to accommodate
these differing values and norms. The OTP’s recent statement, that when assessing
the gravity criteria guiding case selection, it intends to give particular consideration
to ‘Rome Statute crimes that are committed by means of, or that result in, inter alia,
the destruction of the environment, the illegal exploitation of natural resources and
the illegal dispossession of land’ goes some way to integrating wider perspectives on
13 On the historical construction of the Rome Statute’s focus on four ‘core crimes’, see Kamari Maxine Clarke,
‘Is the International Criminal Court Targeting Africa Inappropriately?’, ICC Africa Forum, March 2013 –
January 2014 (http://iccforum.com/africa#Clarke). 8
A COURT IN CRISIS? THE ICC IN AFRICA, AND BEYONDcriminality.14 In addition, although there are some legitimate concerns about the
feasibility of the ACJHPR as currently proposed under the Malabo Protocol, the
process of regionalisation of international criminal justice should also be considered
as a useful means by which to accommodate differing norms and values.
14 Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisa-
tion, 15 September 2016, p. 14; Alex Whiting, ‘Finding Strength Within Constraints’, International Criminal
Justice Today blog, 23 November 2016 (https://www.international-criminal-justice-today.org/arguendo/
icc-prosecutors-constraints-and-strengths/).9
RELATIONS WITH FENCE-SITTING STATES
State challenges to the legitimacy and authority of the ICC have been present since
its creation and are likely to be a permanent fixture. Given that ICC investigations can
have more far-reaching consequences than those of other international courts – to
the extent that the ICC poses a personal threat to high-level and powerful civilian and
military officials – it seems reasonable to expect that the likelihood of a backlash is
also higher than at other international courts. It is also unlikely that the Court will
manage to achieve universal membership in the near future (at present 124
countries are member states), thereby curtailing its jurisdictional scope and conse-
quent ability to counter critiques that it pursues selective justice. As a result, the ICC
will need to invest much time and resources in being accepted as an authoritative
institution which, even if states do not fully agree with it, is nevertheless recognised
as sufficiently legitimate and powerful that states perceive they have more to lose by
abandoning the Court. This will require the Court to invest even more significantly
than it already does in diplomatic efforts to manage these inevitable backlashes and
limit their impact.15
In this context, the Court’s management of relations with African ‘fence-sitting
states’ will be particularly important as future withdrawal threats are likely to come
from that corner. A substantial group of African countries have an ambivalent
attitude towards the Court, being neither full supporters nor full opponents of the
Court. This includes the CAR, Chad, the DRC, Gabon, Namibia, Uganda, the Republic
of Congo, Zambia and until recently, South Africa. These states have expressed criti-
cism (some more vocally than others) of the Court’s operations and what they
perceive as its bias against Africa, with some even supporting the call for a mass
withdrawal from the Court. At the same time, they have cooperated with the ICC on
certain issues (exchange of information and supporting investigations) but not on
others (executing the arrest warrant of President Bashir). This ambivalent attitude is
explained by two factors: domestic political interests and regional accommodation.
Firstly, many fence-sitting states support the ICC to the extent that it provides them
with a measure of international legitimacy and can prove useful in prosecuting
armed groups active on their territory. At the same time, elites in these countries
remain nervous about the possibility that the ICC could investigate them in the
future, making them likely to shift into the camp of Court opponents when they feel
threatened. This puts the ICC in the unenviable position of having to balance its need
for state cooperation with the necessity to avoid being tethered to the political inter-
ests of domestic elites in situation countries. Over the coming year, the ICC’s
15 Scheffer 2016, op.cit.; Steven C. Roach, ‘How Political is the ICC? Pressing Challenges and the Need for
Diplomatic Efficacy’, Global Governance 19:4, 2013.10
A COURT IN CRISIS? THE ICC IN AFRICA, AND BEYONDrelations with Ivory Coast (where the Court is expected to broaden its investigations
after it initially only indicted individuals affiliated to ousted president Laurent
Gbagbo) and the CAR (where the Court will look at crimes committed in 2012, and
should in principle target both ex-Seleka and anti-Balaka forces) will therefore need
to be watched closely.
A second driver of African states’ ambiguity is the contradictory normative pressures
they face at the international and regional level. Because the principle of African
unity and solidarity remains a central component of diplomatic relations within the
AU, acting in contravention of this principle can entail high political costs for states.
Consequently, supporting African states that are targeted by the ICC and adhering to
the anti-imperial discourse of Court opponents is a politically savvy strategy to
follow. For some, it is a question of boosting their regional standing and leadership
(Uganda, Chad and South Africa) while for others it is about ensuring key regional
backing on other more important political and security dossiers (DRC, CAR).
Thus, what from the outside may look like a lack of resolve on the part of these
states, in reality reflects their attempt to balance competing political and normative
pressures. The risk that this balancing exercise ultimately tips to the ICC’s disadvan-
tage is starkly illustrated by the South African case. The latter furthermore offers a
reminder that the legitimacy of the Court among states is ever-shifting and cannot
be taken for granted, even when a state appears to have internalised the ICC’s anti-
impunity norm.16 Building dialogues with fence-sitting states – for whom, at present,
the priority still lies with reforming the Court rather than withdrawing from it – will
thus be far more important for the ICC than an illusory attempt to get fervent court
opponents on board.
16 Andrew J. Grant and Spencer Hamilton, ‘Norm Dynamics and International Organisations: South Africa in
the African Union and the International Criminal Court’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 54:2, 2016.11
FRAUGHT UNSC–ICC RELATIONS
The adoption by powerful states of active measures to keep themselves out of the
ICC’s reach while (ab)using their position within the UNSC to align the Court’s activi-
ties with their political interests has contributed significantly to perceptions that the
ICC is biased and politicised. First, there has been a glaring inconsistency in the
willingness of the UNSC to refer certain instances of mass human rights violations to
the ICC (Sudan, Libya) but not others where similar grave atrocities have been
committed (Syria, Israel). This practice has been driven by the political interests of
the five permanent members of the UNSC. States have used the ICC threat to gain
political leverage over what were then considered ‘pariah states’ and to delegitimise
the leaders of these countries. At the same time, they have wielded their veto power
to block referrals of ‘friendly’ countries: the United States has made it clear that it
will oppose any attempt to bring Israel before the ICC, while Russia and China have
blocked a referral of the Syrian situation to the ICC. There has furthermore been a
lack of consistency in state support for ICC investigations once referrals have been
made, as reflected by the unwillingness to allocate UN funding to the ICC to cover the
costs of referred cases and by the UNSC’s meek response to ICC findings of state non-
cooperation (as happened in the case of Sudan).
Second, and maybe even more problematically, powerful states (particularly the
United States) have pushed through measures and exemptions meant to insulate
themselves from ICC scrutiny. For instance, the United States pressured states into
signing bilateral immunity agreements that would prevent states from handing
‘current or former Government officials, employees (including contractors), or
military personnel or nationals of one Party’ to the ICC, thereby protecting US
nationals from the ICC. Close to 100 such agreements were concluded and states that
refused to sign them faced the suspension of aid transfers and military assistance.
The United States also forced through a UNSC resolution in July 2002 granting troops
from non-state parties that contributed to UN peacekeeping missions a blanket
immunity from prosecution by the ICC. Widespread opposition from other states led
to the non-renewal of this resolution in 2004, but similar exemptions for UN peace-
keeping troops from non-state parties were included in the UNSC resolutions refer-
ring the situations in Libya and Sudan to the ICC. These resolutions furthermore
failed to impose a broad obligation for all states, including non-state parties, to
cooperate with the Court, instead limiting this obligation to the countries that were
being referred to the Court. In practice, different layers of accountability for non-
state parties have thus been created: while powerful non-state parties have used
their power to protect themselves from the ICC, they are mobilising their power
within the UNSC to submit other, weaker non-state parties to the ICC.12
A COURT IN CRISIS? THE ICC IN AFRICA, AND BEYONDAlthough severing the formal link between the ICC and UNSC might be considered
desirable, it is currently unlikely to be politically feasible. Instead, efforts should go
into devising measures that can, as much as possible, contain the potentially nefar-
ious effects of the UNSC on the ICC. For starters, the ICC should reflect critically on
the extent to which it is willing to accommodate realpolitik considerations as it did in
the cases of Libya, Iraq, and Israel/Palestine. In theory, the ICC could even decide not
to pursue investigations into a case referred to it by the UNSC.17 While there is an
understandable need for the Court to try to maintain cordial relations with powerful
states, current experience shows that the ICC is paying a very high price for this, both
in terms of its legitimacy and efficacy. A key role is also set aside here for ICC state
parties, who should use their diplomatic influence to counter or limit attempts to
politicise the ICC through the UNSC; they have an important role to fulfil as mediators
between non-state parties sitting on the UNSC and the ICC.
To counter the negative effects of the UNSC’s politics on the ICC’s credibility, more
emphasis should also be placed on strengthening the supportive role the UNSC can
play in ICC investigations. This entails ensuring that UN peacekeeping missions are
provided with strong and efficient mandates to fully cooperate with the ICC (the
same goes for regional or sub-regional peace operations), including the arrest of
indictees. It is also about ensuring that, beyond the formal mandate, the political and
military leadership of UN peacekeeping missions effectively prioritise cooperation
with and support for the ICC and the fight against impunity, which has not always
been the case so far.
In addition, the UNSC (and the Assembly of State Parties or ASP) should play their
designated roles in dealing with states that do not cooperate with the ICC. So far,
states that have refused to cooperate with the Court have faced limited sanctions or
sustained diplomatic pressure. This has signaled to countries that they have little to
fear from acting against the Court or threatening to withdraw. Getting the ASP and
UNSC to take a more assertive position against state non-cooperation could help
bolster the Court’s clout.
Finally, ICC state parties could also advocate for future UNSC referrals to be accom-
panied with appropriate provisions for the transfer of UN funding to the ICC, as
provided for under the UN–ICC relationship agreement, or with states’ voluntary
contributions, as Canada did to support ICC investigations in Sudan. This might be
challenging considering the budgetary constraints faced by many European
countries today, which have seen some advocate for a ‘zero growth policy’ for the
ICC’s budget, and US President Donald Trump’s announcement that it will signifi-
17 Adejoké Babington-Ashaye, ‘Politicizing the International Criminal Court: Redefining the Role of the United
Nations Security Council in the Age of Accountability’, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American
Society of International Law 108, 2014, p. 303.13
A COURT IN CRISIS? THE ICC IN AFRICA, AND BEYONDcantly slash its funding for international organisations, including the UN.18 Exces-
sively curtailing the Court’s funding however, will affect its ability to fulfil its
mandate, let alone expand its global reach, and to achieve its stated aim of guaran-
teeing a broad role for victims at the ICC. It may also lead to further decisions to limit
ICC travel spending, which risks negatively impacting the quality of its investigations
and the evidence collected, and consequently the viability of trial processes.19
18 Colum Lynch, ‘Trump Administration Eyes $1 Billion in Cuts to UN Peacekeeping’, Foreign Policy, 23 March
2017.
19 Dov Jacobs, ‘The ICC Katanga Judgment: A Commentary (part 1): Investigation, Interpretation and the
Crimes’, Spreading the Jam blog, 10 March 2014 (https://dovjacobs.com/2014/03/10/the-icc-katanga-judg-
ment-a-commentary-part-1-investigation-interpretation-and-the-crimes/). 14
ICC MONOPOLISATION OF THE JUSTICE FIELD
The current backlash against the ICC and accusations that it acts as an instrument of
neo-colonialism is also fed by its growing monopolisation of justice discourses and
practices. The ICC, and international criminal law more broadly, have become
powerful frames around which justice issues are articulated; they are increasingly
advocated as the dominant norm for dealing with armed conflicts and legacies of
mass atrocities, particularly in Africa.20 What has emerged is a powerful discourse
portraying the ICC as sitting at the top of a ‘justice pyramid’ – that is, it is put forward
as the most appropriate response to mass atrocities. While the existence of other,
alternative justice responses is recognised, they are commonly presented as insuffi-
cient or secondary responses to the ICC. They are often also forced to fit within the
standards set by international criminal justice. This growing hegemony of the ICC sits
somewhat uncomfortably with the Rome Statute, which is built on a strong presump-
tion that the ICC is not an inherently superior justice response.21 Yet what has
emerged is a growing tendency to (re)interpret the Rome Statute in a way that serves
to introduce increasingly vertical relations between the ICC and other, more local
justice responses. Three illustrations of this can be provided.
First, the ICC has interpreted the complementarity principle and attendant admissi-
bility criteria in a way that nearly guarantees its ability to claim jurisdiction. It has
simultaneously adopted a broad interpretation of the criteria that a case is only
admissible before the ICC if a ‘State is “unwilling or unable” genuinely to carry out
the investigations and prosecution’ (Article 17b), particularly when dealing with state
self-referrals, and a narrow interpretation of criteria for applying the non bis in idem
principle, basing it on notions of ‘same conduct’ and the need for national proceed-
ings to mirror ICC proceedings. This has effectively amounted to shifting the ICC from
a complementarity regime to one of ‘quasi primacy’.22
Second, the emergence of the principle of burden-sharing offers a further illustration
of efforts at reinterpreting the ICC’s reach.23 Under this principle, the ICC is put
forward as having priority in dealing with the most serious crimes and the most
responsible perpetrators, while other justice mechanisms should only deal with
lesser crimes and perpetrators. While the Rome Statute nowhere states this idea of
20 Sarah M.H. Nouwen and Wouter G. Werner, ‘Monopolizing Global Justice: International Criminal Law as
Challenge to Human Diversity’, Journal of International Criminal Justice 13:1, 2015, p. 161; Obiera Chinedu
Okafor and Uchechukwu Ngwaba, ‘The International Criminal Court as ‘Transitional Justice’ Mechanism in
Africa: Some Critical Reflections’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 9:1, 2015. 
21 Padraig McAuliffe, ‘From Watchdog to Workhorse: Explaining the Emergence of the ICC’s Burden-Sharing
Policy as an Example of Creeping Cosmopolitanism’, Chinese Journal of International Law 13:2, 2014, p. 277.
22 Carsten Stahn, ‘Admissibility Challenges Before the ICC: From Quasi-Primacy to Qualified Deference?’ in
Carsten Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015).
23 McAuliffe 2014, op.cit.15
A COURT IN CRISIS? THE ICC IN AFRICA, AND BEYONDburden-sharing, and the basis on which the ICC should have such an automatic
primacy is never expressly stated,24 it has become commonplace in discourses about
the ICC and its relationship with other justice responses such as hybrid courts,
domestic courts or truth and reconciliation commissions. The idea of burden-sharing
illustrates how certain provisions of the Rome Statute which are solely meant to
regulate the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction (such as the complementarity principle and
Article 5 of the Rome Statute), are being increasingly interpreted as overarching
organisational principles for the entire justice architecture, thereby subsuming other
justice responses to the ICC frame.
A third and final illustration of the creeping hegemony of the ICC is the recent intro-
duction of the principle of ‘reverse complementarity’ in the law establishing the
Special Criminal Court for the Central African Republic (SCC), which gives the ICC
primacy over the SCC and Central African courts.25 While it is too early to tell whether
this provision will have significant practical implications, it sets an important prece-
dent in terms of altering one of the fundamental principles on which the ICC is built.26
The growing monopolisation of justice discourses by the ICC and international
criminal justice has partly been driven by the Court’s need to assert its institutional
legitimacy, relevance and visibility. However, it is also underpinned by normative
assumptions about the inherent greater effectiveness and legitimacy of international
judicial processes, the moral superiority of the criminal response to mass atrocities,
and the inherent benevolence of international criminal justice. This is intricately
linked to the prevailing faith ICC proponents have in the transformative power of
international criminal law.27 While many view the ICC’s growing dominance as an
indisputably positive development, a critical eye should be cast over these normative
assumptions and the narrowing of justice discourses and practices that results from
this construction of a justice hierarchy. For instance, the ICC has not proven to be
more effective than domestic courts at gaining custody of accused or at prosecuting
heads of state and high-level officials, as a result of a combination of practical and
political constraints. And like domestic courts, the ICC faces challenges in both
collecting evidence and building cases, and accusations of politicisation and victor’s
justice. Furthermore, strong evidence is still lacking that the ICC achieves the
24 While the Rome Statute limits the ICC’s jurisdiction to ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the interna-
tional community as a whole’ (Article 5), the notion that the ICC should only prosecute the most responsible
perpetrators is not required by the Rome Statute. Rather the Rome Statute has been interpreted as such by
the Pre-Trial Chamber and the Office of the Prosecutor.
25 Loi Organique No. 15.003 portant création, organisation et fonctionnement de la Cour pénale spéciale, 3
June 2015, Art. 37.
26 Valerie Arnould, ‘The Uncertain Promise of Hybrid Justice in the Central African Republic’, Africa Policy Brief
14, Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations, September 2015; Patryck I. Labuda, ‘The Special
Criminal Court in the Central African Republic: Failure or Vindication of Complementarity?’, Journal of Inter-
national Criminal Justice 15:1, 2017, 192-194.
27 David S. Koller, ‘The Faith of the International Criminal Lawyer’, New York University Journal of International
Law and Politics 40, 2008.16
A COURT IN CRISIS? THE ICC IN AFRICA, AND BEYONDcommonly stated preventive, expressivist and peace-promoting goals,28 or that it is
able to advance not only the interests of global justice but also those of local
justice.29 As a form of justice that is seen by many as distant, selective, and slow, the
ICC also struggles to build its credibility beyond its immediate constituency of human
rights advocates.
More broadly, while deploying a criminal justice response to mass violence may
appeal to our moral sense of fairness and justice, it is not always the most effective
way of responding to and preventing further atrocities. The latter often require
changing the underlying institutional conditions and cultures that authorise and
legitimise the resort to mass human rights violations, as well as addressing broader
structural violence and relations of distrust within societies and between the state
and citizens, which requires in turn a broader set of policy interventions than mere
criminalisation of these acts and the punishment of individual perpetrators.30 Inter-
national criminal justice also offers a restrictive frame through which to analyse and
understand the nature of violence in today’s armed conflicts and to apprehend the
complex, overlapping and diversified nature of political and moral responsibility that
characterises many conflict and repressive environments.31 Moreover, by narrowly
equating justice with legal accountability, it obfuscates the multidimensional
character of the notion of justice, with the risk of displacing locally grounded justice
conceptions and needs, which may comprise accountability but are not necessarily
limited to it.32 Criminal justice is thus rarely a sufficient means to provide justice in
the wake of mass atrocities.
Accordingly, it is important to place the ICC within a more horizontal relationship
with other justice responses, rather than advocate for the ICC to be the default
response to mass atrocities. Care should also be taken to avoid framing justice
debates around reductionist binaries such as justice vs. peace, anti-impunity vs.
impunity, justice vs. reconciliation.33 Portraying the ICC as the instrument of justice
28 Tom Buitelaar, ‘The ICC and the Prevention of Atrocities: Criminological Perspectives’, Human Rights
Review 17:3, 2016; Mark A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007); Kate Cronin-Furman, ‘Managing Expectations: International Criminal Trials and the
Prospects of Deterrence of Mass Atrocity’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 7:3, 2013.
29 Arnould Valerie, ‘Rethinking what ICC success means at the Bemba Trial’, OpenGlobalRights, 14 September
2016. Even if one adopts the view that the ICC’s primary purpose is to be an instrument of ‘juridified diplo-
macy’ – that is, a diplomatic instrument aimed at promoting international peace and justice – rather than
an instrument for local justice (see, for instance, David S. Koller, ‘The Global as Local. The Limits and Possi-
bilities of Integrating International and Transitional Justice’ in Christian De Vos, Sara Kendall and Carsten
Stahn, Contested Justice. The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2015)), evidence of the ICC’s effectiveness in fulfilling the former role is
currently lacking.
30 Danielle Celermajer, ‘Navigating the minefield of working with perpetrators’, OpenGlobalRights, 30 March
2017.
31 Significant tensions sometimes exist between the way in which legal responsibility is defined through crim-
inal justice processes and the manner in which victims and societies at large perceive responsibility on the
basis of political and moral considerations.
32 Nouwen and Werner 2015, op.cit.
33 Karen Engle, Zinaida Miller and D.M. Davis, Anti-Impunity and the Human Rights Agenda (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 1-12.17
A COURT IN CRISIS? THE ICC IN AFRICA, AND BEYONDand anti-impunity and all other justice approaches as instruments of ‘non-justice’
and peace is highly questionable. Truth commissions, vetting, reparations, memori-
alisation, community-based justice responses, etc. are as much about providing
justice for victims as is the ICC, though they might emphasise and address different
dimensions of justice. The choice isn’t between the ICC and impunity; there exists a
whole range of other justice instruments that are as legitimate and, in some circum-
stances more appropriate, than the ICC.
Stepping away from efforts to claim ICC primacy in responding to mass atrocities
could also help curtail backlash against the Court. The displacement of local concep-
tions and approaches to justice that results from the ICC’s monopolisation of the
justice field forms a fertile breeding ground for resentment towards the ICC, as it can
lead states and local communities to (maybe unfairly) see the ICC as an instrument
that silences them and stifles efforts to develop context- and cultural-sensitive
justice responses. Countering this is not just an issue for the ICC though; often it is
ICC proponents outside of the Court – among states, human rights advocates and the
diffuse community of experts – who are most adamant in pushing the ICC forward as
the sole legitimate response to mass atrocities. Instead, they would do well to display
more humility about what the ICC can achieve and the extent to which it can satisfy
the multiplicity of justice needs, and commit to equally supporting other approaches
where these offer more appropriate or effective means of delivering justice for
victims. In essence, the ICC needs to coexist alongside rather than above local
conceptions of justice and alternative justice approaches.18
CONCLUSION
The ICC has been at the centre of heated contestations between proponents who
advance the Court as a beacon of justice against the forces of impunity and violence,
and those who accuse the Court of being a politicised, neo-colonial and biased insti-
tution. While both of these positions are overly simplistic and unfair representations
of the Court, the confrontation seemed to reach its apogee with the announcements
in October 2016 by Burundi, South Africa, and Gambia of their intent to withdraw
from the Court. In a way, the Court has always been an ‘institution in crisis’. Since its
inception, it has faced states’ attempts to marginalise its influence. However, the
escalating tensions with the AU and the African withdrawals seemed to pose a more
significant threat, not least because they signaled a definite break between the Court
and African states, who were initially important ICC backers.
Now that this threat has waned, with South Africa and Gambia stepping back from
their intentions to withdraw, it can be hoped that a more constructive environment
may emerge for reflections about the Court’s future. It would, however, be a mistake
to return to business as usual and be complacent about the significant challenges the
ICC continues to face. Now is the time to engage in reflections about how to reform
or rethink the Court’s role – and it is clear that many African states, even those who
are not currently contemplating leaving the ICC, are placing reform of the Court high
on their agenda and will likely continue to do so. Some of these reforms will be of a
mostly legal and technical nature. This paper, however, proposes that there is also a
need to reflect on more overarching issues relating to the normative order the ICC
embodies, the politics surrounding the Court, and its place in the broader justice
architecture. While these may seem like less immediately tangible challenges,
addressing them may prove central to strengthening the Court’s credibility and effec-
tiveness.19
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